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ABSTRACT 
The struggle between supranational and intergovernmental 
visions on European integration came to dramatic heights with 
the little-known battle over the Fouchet Plan in 1961-62. This 
study examines the internal negotiations within the Fouchet 
Commission, its share in the failure of the Fouchet Plan and 
how national politicians and interests shaped its negotiations. 
Thanks to new archival research the understudied influence of 
the Fouchet Commission has been scrutinised, which provides 
a new perspective on the failure of the Fouchet Plan, namely 
the evasion of the members of the Fouchet Commission to 
discuss fundamental principles as well as their incompetence 
in reaching compromises, and on the process of European 
integration, i.e. the decisive role played by national 
politicians. This supports the integration theory of 
intergovernmentalism and asks fundamental questions about 
the role national actors play in European integration. The 
recent election of French president Emmanuel Macron has 
given a new impulse to the process of European integration, 
indicating that besides the European institutions, national 
politicians play an important role in shaping European 
integration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
European integration has a long history of strife between 
federalists, those in favour of a supranational Europe, and 
confederalists, those in favour of an intergovernmental 
Europe. The failures of the European Defence Community 
(EDC) in 1954 and the European Constitution in 2005 are 
prominent examples. A lesser-known attempt to further 
political integration is the Fouchet Plan, initiated by French 
president Charles de Gaulle in 1961-62, which proposed a 
political union with a common foreign and defence policy.1  
 The place of the Fouchet Plan in the historiography 
of European integration is ambiguous. Scholars have 
                                                          
1 https://www.cvce.eu/obj/draft_treaty_fouchet_plan_november_1961-en-
485fa02e-f21e-4e4d-9665-92f0820a0c22 consulted on 7-7-17. 
2 Dinan, D., Ever Closer Union: an Introduction to European Integration, 
London (1999), 43; Blair, A., The European Union since 1945, London 
(2005), 33; Moravcsik, A., The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and 
State Power from Messian to Maastricht, London (1998), 159, 181-182, 
475; Cini, M. and Pérez-Solórzano Borragán, M.,  European Union Politics, 
Oxford (2016); Bloes, R. Le Plan Fouchet et le Problème de l’Europe 
Politique, Bruges (1970).  
interpreted the importance of the Fouchet episode for 
European integration differently and have given various 
explanations for its failure. While political scientists like 
Desmond Dinan and Alasdair Blair see the Fouchet Plan as 
one of many in the history of European integration and 
explain its failure by the French wish for more 
intergovernmentalism as opposed to the wish of the other five 
members of the European Communities (EC) for a more 
supranational Europe, political scientist Andrew Moravcsik 
argues that the failure of the Fouchet Plan caused new 
discussions on institutional reforms within the EC, claiming 
the plan was a strategy of de Gaulle to secure French 
commercial interests. This debate is complicated by different 
integration theories such as neo-functionalism and (liberal) 
intergovernmentalism.2  
 However, on one issue there seems to be consensus 
among historians and political scientists: the prominent 
contributions of national politicians, especially that of de 
Gaulle, before and during the Fouchet Plan negotiations. The 
Fouchet Commission’s stake during the negotiations is hardly 
mentioned.3 This is remarkable, since the commission, 
composed of one delegate from each member state, was 
assigned to design plans for a political union. One would 
expect it to lead in the discussions about the content and the 
form of the political union in the making. In addition, the 
Fouchet Plan was heavily criticised by the Dutch and Belgian 
delegations despite being part of the Fouchet Commission. 
How was it possible that these delegations were so negative 
about the plan they presumably co-wrote? The aim of this 
paper is to analyse the input of the Fouchet Commission 
during the Fouchet negotiations and to inquire into its internal 
negotiations to determine the actual contribution of the 
commission to the Fouchet negotiations. 
 
SECTIONS 
To determine the contribution of the Fouchet Commission, 
two questions will be answered: first, what was the context of 
the Fouchet Plan and who were the main actors involved. 
Second, why did the Fouchet Plan fail and what was the 
Fouchet Commission share in its failure. First, a short 
3 Sutton, M., France and the Construction of Europe, New York & Oxford 
(2007), 96; Vanke, J.W., ‘An impossible Union, Dutch objections to the 
Fouchet plan (1959-1962)’ in Cold War History, Volume 2, Number 1, 
2001, 101; Bouwman, B., ‘“Longing for London”: The Netherlands and the 
Political Cooperation Initiative, 1959-62’ in Building Postwar Europa: 
National Decision-Makers and European Institutions, 1948-1963 edited by 
Anne Deighton, New York (1995), 153; Teasdale, A., ‘The Fouchet Plan: 
De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe’ in LSE ‘Europe in 
question’ Discussion Paper Series, Number 117, 2016. 
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methodological overview will be given, after which these 
questions will be answered. 
 
Methodology 
This study is based on critically reading primary sources and 
secondary literature. Academic articles and books by 
historians and political scientists are used to provide an 
overview of the debate on the Fouchet Plan. In addition, 
various primary sources have been used, such as official 
European and state documents and speeches and memoirs by 
political actors. 
 The main primary sources used are telegrams sent by 
the Dutch delegate in the Fouchet Commission, J.A.G. Baron 
de Vos van Steenwijk, to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. In these telegrams, de Vos van Steenwijk summarised 
the committee meetings and explained the Dutch perspective 
on the Fouchet negotiations. Within the scope of this study it 
was not feasible to examine the briefings of the other members 
of the Fouchet Commission, yet this Dutch bias has been taken 
into account (e.g. by analysing too the diaries of Charles de 
Gaulle and his foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville 
on this subject). In addition, in a more extensive investigation 
other primary sources might also be consulted, such as 
personal letters from the delegates, confidential meetings of 
the delegations and newspaper articles. However, these 
telegrams, archived in the National Archives of the 
Netherlands in The Hague, have been chosen because they 
indicate the official and uncensored view of the Dutch 
delegation in the Fouchet negotiations. They were available in 
time for this paper and have proven to be a valuable source of 
information concerning diplomatic negotiations in the EC. 
Indeed, to establish the contribution of the Fouchet 
Commission to the negotiations, it can be argued that inside 
sources are the most helpful in researching this role.  
  
Context and Main Actors 
The Fouchet Plan and its failure have to be seen in light of the 
previous efforts towards European integration in the 1950s. 
The EC, established by the Treaty of Paris (1951) and the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), were unique in that they established a 
High Authority, later merged into the European Commission, 
which was granted decision-making power in certain shared 
domains between the six participating states. The Fouchet 
Plan would have been a logical step in this process of an ‘ever 
closer union’ by granting more competences to the High 
Authority.4 
 Moreover, during 1958-62 the tensions in Europe 
and the world rose to new heights. The Cold War intensified 
with the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the Berlin Crisis of 
                                                          
4 Dinan, D., Ever Closer Union, 3, 9, 11; Blair, A., The European Union 
since 1945, 3, 17; 
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/treaty_establishing_the_european_economic_co
mmunity_rome_25_march_1957-en-cca6ba28-0bf3-4ce6-8a76-
6b0b3252696e.html consulted on 7-7-17. 
5 Merriman, J., A History of Modern Europe from the Renaissance to the 
Present, New York & London (2010), 1155; Blair, A., The European Union 
since 1945, 31; Dinan, D., Ever Closer Union, vii; De Gaulle, C., Mémoires 
d’Espoir le Renouveau 1958-1962, Evreux (1970), 177-181. 
6 Grünbacher, A., The Making of German Democracy, West Germany 
during the Adenauer era, 1945-65, Manchester & New York (2010), 198-
204; Kersten, A., Luns, Een Politieke Biografie, Voorburg (2010), 203, 228. 
231; Segers, M., ‘De Gaulle’s Race to the Bottom: The Netherlands, France 
and the Interwoven problems of British EEC Membership and European 
1961. These events sparked a new urge for further European 
integration, such as the Fouchet Plan, which would establish 
a common foreign and defence policy. Yet, with de Gaulle 
returning to power in 1958, preventing a civil war in France 
and establishing the French Fifth Republic – which granted 
more weight to the office of president – an ardent opponent of 
supranational institutions would dominate European politics 
for the decade to come. De Gaulle’s belief in the French 
people, in France’s independence as a nation and in its 
predestined role as a superpower would be the pillars of his 
foreign policy.5 
 Other important actors during the Fouchet episode 
were German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, supporter of a 
united Europe based on supranationalism but cautious not to 
alienate France and invested therefore in an ultimate 
reconciliation with its former enemy, and Dutch minister of 
Foreign Affairs Joseph Luns, who saw European integration 
as a means to secure the influence of his small country in 
European affairs. In the Fouchet Commission, the French and 
Dutch delegates Christian Fouchet and J.A.G. baron de Vos 
van Steenwijk played important roles in the negotiations as 
highly experienced diplomats and confidants of their 
superiors.6 
 
The Failure of the Fouchet Commission 
The initiative of a European union with a common foreign and 
defence policy came from de Gaulle, who spoke of the 
possibility of ‘une imposante confédération’7 which would 
veiledly undermine the existing communities and NATO. 
Interestingly, during the negotiations Fouchet denied any of 
these allegations, which is one of the reasons why the Fouchet 
Commission would have a marginal share in the Fouchet 
negotiations.8 In 1961 de Gaulle initiated the first unofficial 
European Council meeting where the political leaders of the 
EC decided to set up the Fouchet Commission. 
 Historian Jeffry W. Vanke argues that the Fouchet 
Plan was doomed to fail from the start.9 This is partly true: 
from the start there were considerably diverging interests. 
Belgium and the Netherlands for example did not want the 
new union to undermine the existing communities nor NATO. 
Moreover, from the very beginning Luns wanted to know how 
the United Kingdom could be involved in the negotiations.10 
This was further complicated when in August 1961 the United 
Kingdom made an official request to adhere to the EC. France 
did not want the British to be involved in the negotiations 
while the Netherlands and Belgium did. This opposition 
would eventually lead to a Dutch and Belgian ‘préalable 
Political Union, 1958-1963’ in Contemporary European History Volume 
19, Number 2, 2010, 116-119. 
7http://fresques.ina.fr/de-gaulle/fiche-media/Gaulle00215/allocution-du-31-
mai-1960.html consulted on 7-7-17. 
8 De Gaulle, C., Lettres, Notes et Carnets : Juin 1958 – Décembre 1960, 
Paris (1985), 382-383; National Archives of the Netherlands (NA), Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs / Code-Archive 1955-1964, archive inventory 2.05.118, 
inventory number 1391, telegram number 3150 of 17-3-61, de Vos van 
Steenwijk to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
9 Vanke, J.W., ‘An impossible Union, Dutch objections to the Fouchet 
plan’, 95-96, 108. 
10 NA, Min. FA ’55-’64, a.i. 2.05.118, i.n. 18753, t.n. 2044 of 11-2-61, 
Dutch Embassy  in Paris to Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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anglais’, meaning that if the United Kingdom was not 
involved, they would stop the negotiations altogether.11 
 In the end it can be argued that the Fouchet 
Commission had a marginal share in the Fouchet negotiations. 
First, because the politicians and diplomats involved had 
ulterior motives.12 Whereas Fouchet in the first meeting of the 
Fouchet Commission stated that the French did not want to 
weaken NATO and did not want to build a Europe without the 
United Kingdom, de Gaulle had already expressed his dismay 
concerning the Anglo-Saxon involvement in Europe at a 
summit with Adenauer in Rambouillet a year earlier.13 
Second, the Fouchet Commission appeared to be more of a 
forum to discuss and exchange views than a place where 
decisions were made.14 This strengthens the 
intergovernmentalist argument that ultimately, the political 
actors responsible make the decisions. Third, the 
incompetence of the Fouchet Commission to come to concrete 
results and the reluctance to discuss fundamental differences 
of opinion, such as whether the proposed union should be 
supranational or intergovernmental.15 For instance, after the 
fifth commission meeting de Vos van Steenwijk wrote to the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ‘As already expected, this 
meeting has delivered nothing and merely emphasised the 
existing oppositions’.16 Fourth, the lack of clarity in the tasks 
assigned to the Fouchet Commission.17 During the seventh 
meeting, for example, the Belgian delegate wanted to 
postpone the meeting to wait for the next ministerial summit, 
since he identified several fundamental problems. Fouchet, 
however, argued that the work to be discussed was within the 
mandate of the commission and did not want to devolve its 
work to the ministers.18 Fifth, too much attention went to 
various sub-commissions and trivial questions, like for 
example the name of the present European University 
Institute.19 Last, both Fouchet Plans (1961, 1962) were 
initiated by surprise by Fouchet and de Gaulle. After the ninth 
meeting, de Vos van Steenwijk wrote to the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that as a ‘coup de theatre’ a document was 
presented which afterwards appeared to be the first Fouchet 
Plan.20 The plans were not drawn up by the Fouchet 
Commission and thus did not represent the interests of all 
member states.21 Even though after the second Fouchet Plan 
there was optimism about finding solutions to the differences 
in opinion, the Fouchet Plan died a silent death in the autumn 
of 1962. One could argue there was only one winner of this 
Fouchet episode: Adenauer, who with the Élysée Treaty 
                                                          
11 Vanke, J.W., ‘An impossible Union, Dutch objections to the Fouchet 
Plan’, 104-105; Teasdale, A., ‘The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle’s 
Intergovernmental Design for Europe’, 33. 
12 De Gaulle, C., Mémoires d’Espoir le Renouveau 1958-1962, 207; NA, 
Min. FA ’55-’64, a.i. 2.05.118, i.n. 1392, t.n. 5695 of 23-6-61, Beyen to the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
13 NA, Min. BuZa ‘55-‘64, a.i. 2.05.118, i.n. 1391, t.n. 3150 van 17-3-61, 
van De Vos van Steenwijk aan Min. BuZa, 3; Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, 
Notes et Carnets : Juin 1958 – Décembre 1960, Parijs (1985), 382-383. 
14 NA, Min. FA ’55-’64, a.i. 2.05.118, i.n. 1391, t.n. 3429 of 25-3-61, de 
Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch Min. of FA.  
15 Ibid, i.n. 1392, t.n. 4720 of 12-5-61, de Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch 
Min. FA; ibid, i.n. 1392, t.n. 5799 of 28-6-61, de Vos van Steenwijk to the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; ibid, i.n. 28672, t.n. 9435 of 13-11-61, 
de Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch Min. of FA; ibid i.n. 28672, t.n. 9435 of 
10-11-61, de Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch Min.  FA; Teasdale, A., ‘The 
Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe’, 34. 
(1963), which resembled to a large extent the Fouchet Plan, 
had his final reconciliation with France.22 
 
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this study was to examine the Fouchet 
Commission’s internal negotiations to determine the 
contribution of the commission to the larger Fouchet 
negotiations, thereby offering a new perspective on why the 
Fouchet Plan failed. By filling this historiographical lacuna, 
one can give an indication of the stakes national politicians 
and diplomats had in the course of European integration in the 
1960s. Thus, this study contributes to the debate about the 
different integration theories and consequently improves our 
understanding of the (still) ongoing process of European 
integration. 
 The Fouchet Plan came into being during an 
intensification of the Cold War. Its initiation in 1961 came 
from French president Charles de Gaulle, whose national 
interests dominated his agenda. The French and Dutch 
delegates in the constituted Fouchet Commission were 
experienced confidants of their superiors, indicating the 
importance de Gaulle and Luns granted to the commission. 
This study has shown, however, that the Fouchet Commission 
appeared to have made, for various reasons, only a marginal 
contribution to the delineation of the Fouchet Plan and that 
the heads of state were the most prominent actors in shaping 
and deciding the Fouchet negotiations. It eventually failed due 
to divergent views on the supranational or intergovernmental 
character of the political union, NATO’s place within the 
union and the involvement of the United Kingdom in the 
negotiations.  
 The importance of the failure of the Fouchet Plan 
should not be underestimated. It was the beginning of a period 
of stagnation in the process of European integration that 
would last until 1986 with the signing of the Single European 
Act (SEA). Moreover, it triggered the development of a new 
integration theory, namely intergovernmentalism. It is 
therefore not surprising that the findings in this paper point 
towards this integration theory. 
 By examining the internal negotiations of the 
Fouchet Commission and its effect on the Fouchet 
negotiations, this study has given insight into the workings 
and effectiveness of European diplomacy in the 1960s. It 
appeared to be closed, worked with stereotypes and had its 
own dynamics in which delegates were prone to blatantly 
16 NA, Min. BuZa ‘55-‘64, a.i. 2.05.118, i.n. 1392, t.n. 4720 van 12-5-61, 
van De Vos van Steenwijk aan Min. BuZa, 1. In Dutch: ‘Zoals overigens 
reeds werd verwacht heeft [de] bijeenkomst niets opgeleverd en slechts de 
(…) naar voren gekomen tegenstelling onderstreept.’ 
17 Ibid, i.n. 1392, t.n. 5799 of 28-6-61, de Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch 
Min. of FA. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid, i.n. 1391, t.n. 3180, de Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch Min. FA; 
ibid, i.n. 18754, t.n. 7400 of 6-9-61, Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch Min. 
FA. 
20 Ibid,, i.n. 28672, t.n. 8689 van 19-10-61, van De Vos van Steenwijk aan 
Min. BuZa, 1. 
21 Ibid, i.n. 28672, t.n. 8689 of 19-10-61, de Vos van Steenwijk to the Dutch 
Min. FA.   
22 Grünbacher, A., The Making of German Democracy, 211; Teasdale, A., 
‘The Fouchet Plan: De Gaulle’s Intergovernmental Design for Europe’, 48.  
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deceive one another.23 Even though the Fouchet 
Commission’s share appeared marginal in the overall 
negotiations, it does deserve a place in the history of the 
Fouchet Plan. In addition to the aforementioned reasons, it 
provided a forum for the exchange of views and it was used in 
preparation for European summits. The Fouchet Commission 
therefore deserves more academic attention than it has done 
as yet.  
 More research on the Fouchet Commission and 
national actors will contribute to a better understanding of 
European integration. This study highlighted both actors in the 
Fouchet Commission and national actors as it is still unclear 
to what extent certain individuals determined the course of 
European integration. It is without doubt that General de 
Gaulle had a major impact on European integration in the 
1960s, but was this because of his personality, because the 
timing was right, or because of the issues he raised? De 
Gaulle’s successors were less influential in shaping European 
politics, while with the recent election of Emmanuel Macron 
France assumes its (rightful?) place in constructing the future 
of the European Union.  
 Since the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) there have not 
been any new treaties or major treaty revisions. Macron, 
however, shows great enthusiasm to take new steps, in close 
collaboration with Angela Merkel’s Germany, in the process 
of European integration. National politicians thus play an 
essential role in the stimulation of European integration. It is 
imperative that the variables of national interests and national 
actors be researched within this framework. Case studies, such 
as the Fouchet Plan, can grant valuable insights into the 
dynamics of European integration.  
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